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Information regarding economic fundamentals is widely dispersed in society, is only im-
perfectly aggregated through prices or other indicators of aggregate activity, and can not be
centralized by the government or any other institution. In this paper we seek to identify policies
that can improve the decentralized use of such dispersed information without requiring the
government to observe this information. We show that this can be achieved by appropriately
designing the contingency of taxation on ex-post public information regarding the realized fun-
damentals and aggregate activity. When information is common (as in the Ramsey literature) or
when agents have private information only about idiosyncratic shocks (as in the Mirrlees liter-
ature), the contingency on fundamentals alone su¢ ces for e¢ ciency. When instead agents have
private information about aggregate shocks, the contingency on aggregate activity is crucial.
An appropriate combination of the two contingencies permits the government to: (i) dampen
the impact of noise and hence reduce non-fundamental volatility, without also dampening the
impact of fundamentals; (ii) induce agents to internalize informational externalities, and hence
improve the speed of social learning; (iii) restore a certain form of constrained e¢ ciency in the
decentralized use of information; (iv) guarantee that welfare increases with the provision of any
additional information.
JEL codes: C72, D62, D82.
Keywords: Optimal policy, private information, complementarities, information externalities,
social learning, e¢ ciency.
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Information regarding commonly-relevant fundamentals￿ such as aggregate productivity and de-
mand conditions over the business cycle, or the pro￿tability of a new technology￿ is widely dispersed
and only imperfectly aggregated in society. As emphasized by Hayek (1945), such information can
not be centralized by the government; instead, society must rely on decentralized mechanisms for
the utilization of such information. This, however, does not mean that the decentralized use of
information is necessarily the one that best serves social interests.
Long ago, Keynes (1936) argued that ￿nancial markets are excessively volatile because profes-
sional investors are more concerned with second-guessing the demands of one another, and hence
with forecasting the forecasts of others, than with forecasting the fundamental value of the assets
they trade.1 More recently, Morris and Shin (2002) used this line of reasoning to argue that ￿nan-
cial markets overreact to noisy public news because they help forecast one another￿ s actions; when
this is the case, the provision of public information￿ e.g., via more transparency in central-bank
communications￿ can reduce welfare. (See also Angeletos and Pavan (2007) for a more extensive
analysis of the social value of information.) Turning attention to the business cycle, the latter may
be driven, not only by variation in fundamentals, but also by noise in the agents￿expectations
about these fundamentals as well as about the choices of other agents, possibly leading to excessive
non-fundamental volatility. Finally, individuals are unlikely to internalize how their own choices
a⁄ect the information of others through ￿nancial prices, macroeconomic data, and other forms
of social learning; if they could be persuaded to base their decisions more on their idiosyncratic
sources of information, social learning could become more e¢ cient, leading to less noise and higher
welfare. Banerjee (1992) and Vives (1993, 1997) were among the ￿rst to emphasize how the failure
to internalize such informational externalities can lead to excessive herding and suboptimal social
learning. (See also Chamley (2004).) Chari and Kehoe (2003) study how this failure can amp-
lify volatility in ￿nancial markets, while Amador and Weill (2007) show how it can also make the
provision of public information have a negative e⁄ect on welfare by slowing down social learning.
Motivated by these observations, this paper seeks to identify policies that help the government
control how agents utilize their dispersed sources of information regarding aggregate fundamentals.
Of course, this goal could be achieved easily if the government could observe these sources of
information, for it could then impose direct taxes on their utilization; but such direct taxes are
clearly not plausible. We thus seek to identify policies that achieve the same goal in an indirect
way, without requiring the government to observe these sources of information. Our contribution
is to show that this can be done by appropriately designing the contingency of taxation on public
information regarding the realized fundamentals and, more crucially, the realized aggregate activity.
1Elements of this ￿beauty-contest￿character of ￿nancial markets have been formalized recently in Allen, Morris
and Shin (2003), Angeletos, Lorenzoni and Pavan (2007), and Bacchetta and Wincoop (2005).
1The logic is simple. The anticipation of these contingencies a⁄ects the incentives the agents
face when they decide how to use their dispersed sources of information. The contingency on
fundamentals has a symmetric e⁄ect across all sources of information: the more an agent expects
marginal taxes to increase with fundamentals, the less he responds to any information about the
fundamentals. In contrast, the contingency on aggregate activity has an asymmetric e⁄ect: it
penalizes the agents relatively more when they react to signals whose errors are highly correlated
across the agents. This is because the contingency on aggregate activity, unlike the one on funda-
mentals, a⁄ects the degree of strategic complementarity featured in equilibrium. Indeed, the more
marginal taxes are expected to increase with realized aggregate activity, the weaker the comple-
mentarity agents perceive in their choices, and hence the weaker the incentive to react to sources of
information that help forecast one another￿ s beliefs and actions; and because it is precisely sources
of information with highly correlated noise that are relatively better predictors of others￿beliefs
and actions, this contingency penalizes relatively more the use of such sources of information. Im-
portantly, this is achieved only in an indirect way: despite the fact that direct taxes on the use of
the di⁄erent sources of information are not feasible, the contingency of taxes on realized aggregate
activity provides similar incentives.
An appropriate design of the two contingencies thus permits the government to dampen the
impact of noise without also dampening the impact of fundamentals; to improve the speed of social
learning; and, in overall, to restore e¢ ciency in the decentralized use of information. This in turn
also guarantees that welfare increases with any additional information, whether private or public,
thus helping the government bypass the complications considered, inter alia, by Morris and Shin
(2002), Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and Amador and Weill (2007).
These insights are not limited to any speci￿c application. In this paper we thus opt to provide
some general lessons that may be useful across a variety of applications. We start in the next section
by illustrating the incentive e⁄ects of the aforementioned contingencies within a simple investment
example. We then proceed to an abstract framework that allows, subsequently, for both rich payo⁄
interactions and informational externalities across the agents. These two steps shed further light
on the generality of the insights, on the circumstances under which it is important for optimality
to use the aforementioned policy contingencies, and on the novelty of our policy exercise.
Related Literature. Although there is a long history in studying informational frictions in
macroeconomics (e.g., Phelps, 1970; Lucas, 1972; Townsend, 1983; Woodford, 2002), to the best of
our knowledge this paper is the ￿rst one to study optimal taxation with dispersed information on
aggregate shocks. This is unlike either the Ramsey literature (e.g., Barro, 1979; Lucas and Stokey,
1983; Chari, Christiano and Kehoe, 1994), which does not allow for any private information, or the
Mirrlees/New Dynamic Public Finance literature (e.g., Kocherlakota, 2005), which allows private
information only on idiosyncratic shocks. By ruling out private information on aggregate shocks,
2these literatures have also ruled out the type of ine¢ ciencies and policy objectives that we consider.
Complementary in this respect are Angeletos and La￿ O (2008), Lorenzoni (2008), and Angele-
tos, Lorenzoni and Pavan (2007). The ￿rst two papers study micro-founded business-cycle models
that introduce dispersed information about aggregate productivity; the third one studies the in-
teraction between real investment and ￿nancial markets in an economy where entrepreneurs and
￿nancial traders have dispersed information about the pro￿tability of a new technology. The policy
results in these more applied works verify that our methodology and key policy insights are not lim-
ited to the particular reduced-form framework employed in this paper, nor to taxation as the only
relevant policy instrument. Indeed, the broader lesson from this paper is how the contingencies of
macroeconomic policies on ex post information regarding the realized fundamentals and, crucially,
the realized aggregate activity can improve e¢ ciency in the decentralized use of information.
Related is also the literature on e¢ cient implementation with correlated information and inter-
dependent valuations (see, among others, Cremer and McLean, 1985, McA⁄ee and Reny, 1992,
Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001, McLean and Postlewaite, 2002, 2003, 2004). While the information
structures considered are similar, the e¢ ciency concept we employ here is very di⁄erent in that
we do not allow the planner to transfer information across agents or, equivalently, to send recom-
mendations to an agent that depend on the information received from the other agents. We ￿nd
this restriction appropriate when studying the properties of optimal tax schemes in large econom-
ies: while it seems plausible that the government could use the contingency of taxes on aggregate
outcomes to manipulate the way information is used in equilibrium, it does seem plausible that the
government is able to consult with all agents and transfer information across them before the latter
make their investment, production, and consumption decisions. Our e¢ ciency concept thus shares
with Hayek (1945) and Radner (1962) the idea that information is dispersed and cannot be com-
municated to a ￿center.￿Similar e¢ ciency concepts have been used to study the welfare properties
of large Cournot games (Vives, 1988), of social learning (Vives, 1997), and of rational-expectations
equilibria (La⁄ont, 1985; Messner and Vives, 2005).
2 An example and a preview
We start with an example that illustrates how the anticipation of the aforementioned policy con-
tingencies a⁄ects the incentives agents face when deciding how to react to their dispersed sources
of information regarding the underlying common fundamentals.
There is a large number of risk-neutral agents, each choosing how much to invest in a technology
with unknown productivity ￿ (the commonly-relevant fundamental for this example). Investing k
units costs 1
2k2 of the consumable good in one period and delivers ￿k in the next period, so that
3agent i￿ s payo⁄ is
ui = (e ￿ 1
2k2
i ) + ￿(￿ki ￿ ￿i);
where ki denotes his investment, e his endowment of the consumable good in the ￿rst period,
￿ 2 (0;1) his discount factor, and ￿i his tax payments. Each agent receives two private signals
about ￿, one with only idiosyncratic noise and another with partly common noise: xi = ￿ + ￿i and
yi = ￿ + " + ￿i, where the noises ￿i and ￿i are independent across agents while " is common. The
productivity ￿ and all these noises are Normally distributed, and independent of one another.
The government has no information at the time agents make their choices, nor can it collect the
information that is dispersed among them. It can only commit to tax schedules that are contingent
on information that will become publicly available in the second period, after agents have made their
choices. Suppose that both the fundamentals and the agents￿actions become public information at
that stage and consider tax schedules of the form ￿i = tki ￿L; where L is a lump-sum transfer and
t = t￿￿ + tKK is a proportional tax. The coe¢ cients t￿ and tK parameterize the contingencies of
the tax on the realizations of the fundamental and aggregate investment. Imposing budget balance
gives L = tK ￿ G, where G is the exogenous level of government spending.
Let Ei denote the expectation of agent i conditional on his two signals, xi and yi. In the
absence of policy, his optimal investment would have been ki = ￿Ei￿; now it is given by
ki = ￿Ei[(1 ￿ t￿)￿ ￿ tKK]: (1)
Because of the linearity of this condition and the Gaussian speci￿cation of the information, an
educated guess is that the equilibrium investment of an agent is linear in his two signals. Thus
suppose there exist coe¢ cients (￿0;￿x;￿y) such that the equilibrium investment strategy is
ki = ￿0 + ￿xxi + ￿yyi: (2)
Aggregate investment is then given by K = ￿0 + (￿x + ￿y)￿ + ￿y": Substituting the latter into
condition (1) gives the best response to the strategy speci￿ed in (2). Requiring that the two coincide,
so that the strategy speci￿ed in (2) is indeed an equilibrium, gives the following equilibrium values
for the coe¢ cients ￿x and ￿y:
￿x = (1 ￿ t￿)(1 + tK￿y)￿x￿(tK) and ￿y = (1 ￿ t￿)￿y￿(tK);
where ￿(tK) is a decreasing function of tK, ￿x and ￿y are the precisions of the two signals, and ￿y
is the correlation across agents of the noises in the second signal.2
2Formally, ￿y = Corr(yi ￿ ￿;yj ￿ ￿) 8 i 6= j: Also, the formula for ￿(tK) and all the results of this section can be
obtained as a special case of the more general results in the proof of Proposition 3.
4Note that a higher t￿ reduces ￿x and ￿y proportionally; this is because the more agents expect
their marginal taxes to increase with realized productivity, the less their incentive to react to any
source of information regarding productivity. In contrast, a higher tK has an asymmetric e⁄ect,
reducing ￿y more so than ￿x; this is because each agent has an incentive to react relatively less
to sources of information that have a lot of common noise when he expects marginal taxes to
be positively correlated with realized aggregate activity, which in turn is positively correlated, in
equilibrium, with such common noise. It follows that the government can control the reaction of
investment to the noise and the fundamentals by appropriately designing the two contingencies. In
particular, suppose the government sets tK > 0 so as to reduce ￿y=￿x, while also setting t￿ < 0
so as to keep ￿x + ￿y constant. This ensures that agents rely less on the signal with the most
correlated noise (y) and more on the signal with the least correlated noise (x), so that at the end
equilibrium investment reacts less to the underlying common noise even though it reacts the same
to the underlying fundamentals. In contrast, if the government could use only the contingency
on the fundamentals (the contingency that is more familiar from the pertinent literature), then it
could reduce the impact of noise only at the expense of reducing also the impact of fundamentals.
To further appreciate the distinctive role of the two contingencies and how they may a⁄ect the
speed of social learning, consider the ￿signal-to-noise￿ratio in aggregate investment (that is, the
ratio of the volatility that is caused by variation in the underlying fundamentals over the volatility











Clearly, this signal-to-noise ratio is independent of t￿ but increases with tK. This also suggests that
the latter contingency is an important instrument through which the government may be able to
control how much agents (and the government itself) can learn about the underlying fundamentals
from indicators of aggregate economic activity.
To recap, this example illustrates how the aforementioned policy contingencies can a⁄ect the
decentralized use of information. However, this example does not help understand when it may
be desirable to do so, nor when their combination is essential. Moreover, this example rules out
any payo⁄ or informational interactions among the agents, such as the ones that obtain through
trading in markets or other forms of social interaction. Not only are such payo⁄ and informational
interactions central to applications, but also their absence would eliminate any reason for policy
intervention. To address these issues, we proceed as follows in the rest of the paper.
We start in Section 3 with an abstract framework that rules out informational externalities
but allows for rich payo⁄ interactions. This framework is ￿ exible enough to capture, in reduced
form, the role played by dispersed information in a variety of applications. It thus helps identify
5some general principles regarding the impact of dispersed information on equilibrium, e¢ ciency,
and policy￿ principles that are likely to hold across a variety of contexts.
We used a close variant of this framework in Angeletos and Pavan (2007) to study the so-
cial value of information under a particular Gaussian speci￿cation for the information structure.
Whereas that paper abstracted from policy, the contribution of the present paper is precisely the
policy exercise. To highlight the novelty of this exercise relatively to the pertinent policy literat-
ure, we now allow for both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, as well as for arbitrary information
structures.
In Section 4 we revisit the characterization of equilibrium and e¢ cient allocations for the more
general structure of shocks and information considered in the present paper. This permits us to
formalize a particular form of ine¢ ciency that can emerge when, and only when, agents have private
information regarding aggregate shocks. This ine¢ ciency has been ruled out by the pertinent
policy literature, shares certain features with the one conjectured by Keynes, and manifests itself
as excessive non-fundamental volatility (low signal-to-noise ratio) in aggregate activity.
In Section 5 we turn to policy. We ￿rst show, for an arbitrary policy, how the contingencies
of the tax schedule on realized aggregate outcomes a⁄ects the incentives agents face when deciding
how to react to di⁄erent sources of information; this generalizes the insights of the investment
example considered above. We then proceed to study optimal policy; we do so by identifying the
policies that implement the e¢ cient use of information as an equilibrium. This approach may prove
useful for studying optimal policy in a variety of applications that feature dispersed information on
aggregate shocks. Here, we use it to prove a simple but important policy principle: the contingency
on aggregate activity is essential for achieving e¢ ciency￿ or, more generally, for implementing
any feasible allocation￿ only when agents have dispersed information regarding aggregate shocks.
When, instead, agents have either no private information (as in the Ramsey literature) or private
information regarding only idiosyncratic shocks (as in the Mirrlees literature), it su¢ ces to make
the tax schedule contingent on the aggregate fundamentals.
In Section 6 we extend the analysis to a dynamic setting where information is imperfectly
aggregated through signals of aggregate activity; these are short-cuts for ￿nancial prices, macro
data, and other sources of social learning. A new ine¢ ciency emerges as agents do not internalize
how their own choices a⁄ect the quality of information contained in those signals: social learning
would be faster if equilibrium activity reacted more to fundamentals and less to noise. Once again,
this ine¢ ciency relies on private information regarding aggregate shocks: had the agents had private
information only on idiosyncratic shocks, then nothing new could be learned about aggregate shocks
from aggregating their private information. Our key result is that the contingency of the policy on
realized aggregate activity is instrumental for correcting this type of ine¢ ciency as well.
Finally, in Section 7 we discuss how the policies identi￿ed here also guarantee that equilibrium
6welfare necessarily increases with any additional information that the government may be able to
collect and disclose to the market. In contrast, without the policies we identify here, one could not
guarantee that the government should provide the market with more information, even if it were
costless to collect such information.
3 The baseline framework
Actions and payo⁄s. The economy is populated by a continuum of risk-neutral agents of measure
one, indexed by i 2 [0;1], each choosing an action ki 2 R. In addition, there is a government, which
imposes a tax ￿i 2 R on each agent i; subject to the usual budget constraint. The agent￿ s payo⁄
depends on his own action, the actions of others, the tax he pays, and exogenous fundamentals:
ui = V (ki;K;￿k;￿i;￿ ￿) ￿ ￿i;
where K and ￿k denote, respectively, the average and the dispersion of this action in the cross-
section of the population (i.e., the ￿rst moment and the square root of the second moment of the
cross-sectional distribution of k), ￿i 2 ￿ ￿ R is an exogenous fundamental (￿shock￿ ) speci￿c to
agent i, and ￿ ￿ is the average shock in the population. For concreteness, we can think of ki as invest-
ment, ￿i as individual productivity, and ￿ ￿ as aggregate productivity; however, the interpretation
will vary from application to application. Finally, V : R2￿R+￿￿2 ! R is a strictly concave quad-
ratic polynomial and its derivatives satisfy V￿(￿) = V￿￿￿, Vkk + V￿￿ < 0; and VkK < ￿Vkk. These
properties ensure existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and e¢ cient allocations; they also keep
the analysis tractable by ensuring that the ￿rst-order conditions that characterize these allocations
are linear in (k;K;￿;￿ ￿) and independent of ￿k: We let V denote the set of payo⁄ functions V that
satisfy these properties.
Interpretation. This game is meant to be a reduced-form representation of richer applications:
a variety of market interactions may be ￿hidden￿behind our reduced-form game, so that the payo⁄
interdependences embedded in V may originate, not only in direct externalities in preferences or
technologies, but also in pecuniary externalities, monopoly power, credit frictions, and the like.
To illustrate, consider the following example. There is a continuum of households, each con-
sisting of a consumer and a producer, and two goods, one of which could be interpreted as leisure.
Let q1i and q2i denote the respective quantities consumed by household i. His utility is given by
ui = v(q1i;￿i) + q2i; where v(q;￿) = ￿q ￿ q2=2: The term ￿i represents a taste shock in the relative
demand for the two goods. His budget is pq1i + q2i = pe1 + e2 + ￿i; where p is the price of good
1 relative to good 2, e1 and e2 are exogenous endowments, and ￿i are the pro￿ts of the producer
living in household i. These pro￿ts are given by ￿i = pki ￿C(ki); where ki is the quantity of good
1 produced and C(k) = k2=2 its cost in terms of good 2. While production may take place under
7dispersed information about the taste shocks, exchange and consumption decisions take place after
these shocks have been revealed. At that point, household i￿ s demand for good 1 is q1i = ￿i￿p and
the corresponding aggregate demand is Q1 = ￿ ￿ ￿ p: Since market clearing imposes Q1 = K + e1,
the equilibrium price must satisfy p = P(K;￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ K ￿ e1: Using this result, we have that the
utility of household i utility reduces to
ui = V (ki;K;￿i;￿ ￿) ￿ v(￿i ￿ P(K;￿ ￿);￿i) + e2 + P(K;￿ ￿)[(ki ￿ K) ￿ (￿i ￿ ￿ ￿)] ￿ C(ki);
which is readily nested in our framework. Clearly, in this example the interdependence of payo⁄s
emerges in trading (and the associated pecuniary externalities), not any direct technological or
preference externality.
As an alternative example, consider a Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic economy of the type that is
now standard in business-cycle theory. Such an economy can often be reduced to a game in the
pricing or production choices of di⁄erent ￿rms. Within the context of business cycles, one can thus
interpret k as the level of employment or the price set by a ￿rm. The interdependence of payo⁄s
then typically emerges from two channels: the fact that the demand for the product of the individual
￿rm depends on aggregate demand; and the fact that the wage depends on aggregate income. Of
course, the primitive model will typically feature rich micro-foundations and the reduced-form game
may be linear-quadratic only after a certain log transformation. Nevertheless, these complications
need not crucially a⁄ect the applicability of our main policy results. Indeed, as mentioned in
the Introduction, the results in Angeletos and La￿ O (2008) and Lorenzoni (2008) show that both
the methodology and the key policy insights of this paper can be adapted to fully micro-founded
business-cycle economies.
Timing. There are three stages. In stage 1, the government announces a policy rule T that
speci￿es how taxes will be collected in stage 3 as a function of the information that will be public
by then. In stage 2, agents simultaneously choose their actions ki under the information structure
described below. Finally, in stage 3, individual actions and the average fundamental ￿ ￿ are publicly
revealed, taxes are collected according to T, payo⁄s are realized, and the game ends.
Information Structure. Let ￿ denote a set of possible ￿signals￿or ￿types￿for each agent
i, F a set of probability distributions over ￿ ￿ ￿ and P a probability measure over F:3 Nature
￿rst draws f from F using the probability measure P and then uses f to make independent
draws of pairs (￿;!) 2 ￿ ￿ ￿, one for each agent. Given f, let h 2 H denote the corresponding
marginal distribution of ￿ and ￿ 2 ￿ the corresponding marginal distribution of !. We assume
that the probability distribution f coincides with the distribution of (￿;!) in the cross-section
of the population; the average shock is thus equal to ￿ ￿ =
R
￿dh(￿). Furthermore, given any
3While we are not imposing any speci￿c structure on the set ￿, we are implicitly assuming it is a well-behaved
set over which probability measures are well de￿ned; for concreteness, one can think of ￿ as a subset of R
n (n 2 N):
8f 2 F and any (measurable) strategy k : ￿ ! R for the agents, we assume that the the cross-







2:4 In the following, we refer to f as the ￿aggregate state of the
world,￿h as the ￿aggregate economic fundamentals,￿and ￿ as the ￿ distribution of information in
society.￿The description of the information structure is then completed by assuming that, while all
the facts described above are common knowledge, the particular realization of the aggregate state
f need not be; instead, each agent privately observes his own ! and then uses this observation
along with the aforementioned facts to form posterior beliefs about both his own shock ￿ and the
underlying aggregate state f.
Note that this formalization is highly ￿ exible: !i can encode arbitrary information about i￿ s own
productivity and about the joint distribution of productivities and information in the population.
To illustrate, consider the following Gaussian example which is often assumed in applications.
Agent i￿ s productivity is given by ￿i = ￿ ￿ + &i, where ￿ ￿ is Normally distributed with mean ￿￿ and
variance ￿2
￿, while &i is i.i.d. across i, independent of ￿ ￿; Normally distributed with zero mean and
variance ￿2
&: Each agent i￿ s information !i = (zi;xi;yi) consists of a private signal zi = ￿i+￿i about
own productivity, a private signal xi = ￿ ￿ + ￿i about aggregate productivity, and a public signal
yi = y = ￿ ￿ + " about aggregate productivity. The idiosyncratic noises ￿i and ￿i are i.i.d. across i,
Normally distributed with zero mean and variances ￿2
z and ￿2
x; respectively, whereas the common
noise " is Normally distributed with zero mean and variance ￿2
y; all these noises are independent of
one another, as well as of ￿ ￿ and of &i. In this example, (￿￿;￿￿;￿z;￿&;￿x;￿y) are ￿xed parameters,
￿ = R; ￿ = R3; and, for any given (￿ ￿;"); f is a multivariate Normal distribution over R4 with





















One can then conveniently index each f 2 F by the pair (￿ ￿;") 2 R2 and recast the information
structure as follows: Nature ￿rst draws (￿ ￿;") from a bivariate Normal distribution with mean (￿￿;0)
4These assumptions are standard in games with a continuum of players. In certain cases, such as the linear-
Gaussian example described below, these assumptions can be justi￿ed through generalizations of the Strong Law of
Large Numbers (see the technical Appendix in Vives, 2008, for a discussion). Also note that, while we are restricting
attention to symmetric strategy pro￿les, this restriction is without loss of generality in our environment due to the
symmetry and concavity of the payo⁄ structure and the symmetry of the information structure. These properties
guarantee that any two agents with the same information ! necessarily take the same action in equilibrium and are
dictated the same action along the e¢ cient allocation.






and then uses the resulting distribution f to make independent draws of (￿i;zi;xi;yi); one for each
i. The aforementioned bivariate Normal distribution of (￿ ￿;") then plays the same role as P in the
general formalization. Moreover, given any (measurable) strategy k : R3 ! R; the mean and the
dispersion of activity in the cross-section of the population can be expressed directly as a functions
of (￿ ￿;") rather than ￿.
The special case where agents know their own shocks but not the aggregate shocks can then
be nested by letting ￿z = 0 and ￿&;￿x;￿y > 0, while the special case in which there are no
idiosyncratic shocks (as in the example in the previous section) can be nested by letting ￿& =
0. More generally, the aforementioned description of the information structure allows for private
information regarding both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, about only one of the two, or about
neither of these shocks. As it will become clear, the key for our results will be whether agents have
private information regarding ￿aggregate shocks.￿To ￿x language, by ￿aggregate shocks￿we mean
the realized distribution h of these shocks in the cross section, while by ￿idiosyncratic shocks￿we
mean the realized fundamental ￿i that is speci￿c to agent i.
Equilibrium, E¢ ciency, and Policy. A strategy is a mapping k : ￿ ! R that speci￿es
an action for all possible signals ! 2 ￿. Our equilibrium concept is standard Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium. Our e¢ ciency concept, on the other hand, is the following: an e¢ cient allocation (or
￿e¢ cient use of information￿ ) is a strategy k : ￿ ! R that maximizes ex-ante utility.











k(!)d￿(!) and ￿k(￿)2 =
Z
￿
[k(!) ￿ K(￿)]2d￿(!) 8￿ 2 ￿: (4)
As anticipated in the Introduction, this e¢ ciency concept is a constrained one only in the sense
that the ￿planner￿cannot transfer information from one agent to another: the action prescribed
to an agent cannot depend on the private information of other agents. This concept thus bypasses
the details of speci￿c policy instruments and instead identi￿es directly the strategy that maximizes
welfare under the restriction that information cannot be centralized. As it will be illustrated in
the next section, the optimal policy can then be characterized by ￿nding the tax schedule that
implements the e¢ cient use of information as an equilibrium.
Quali￿cation. To avoid a number of distracting technical complications in the characteriz-
10ation of the equilibrium and e¢ cient strategies, all proofs restrict ￿, ￿, and F to be ￿nite sets.
However, nothing substantial in the reasoning depends on this restriction. For example, the proofs
can be extended to the case of multivariate Gaussian information structures, like the one described
above, following similar steps as those in the Technical Appendix of Vives (2008). For this reason,
the notation throughout the paper and the statement of the results do not take a stand on whether
the aforementioned sets are ￿nite or not.
Notation. To simplify, throughout the main text we use Ei [￿]; ki; K; and ￿k as short hands
for E[￿j!i]; k(!i); K(￿); and ￿k(￿):
4 Decentralized use of information
In this section we characterize equilibrium and e¢ cient allocations. Towards this goal, note that
strategic uncertainty (uncertainty regarding one another￿ s actions) can emerge only when agents
have private information on ￿; when instead ￿ is common knowledge, then for any given strategy
the distribution of actions is also common knowledge. Moreover, because no signal ! can contain
more information about the distribution of fundamentals in the population (h) than the entire
distribution of signals (￿), common knowledge of ￿ implies common information regarding h. We
conclude that common knowledge of ￿ is synonymous with both absence of strategic uncertainty
and absence of private information regarding the underlying aggregate shocks.
To isolate the impact of private information regarding aggregate shocks (which is the case of
interest for us), we ￿rst consider the structure of equilibrium and e¢ cient allocations in the absence
of such private information, that is, when ￿ is common knowledge.5 This case nests two important
benchmarks: (i) no private information on anything, as in the Ramsey literature; and (ii) private
information only on idiosyncratic shocks, as in the Mirrlees literature.
Proposition 1. Suppose ￿ is common knowledge, so that agents have no private information









￿ ￿0 + ￿1Ei￿i + ￿2Ei￿ ￿; (5)
while the e¢ cient allocation is given by







The coe¢ cients (￿0;￿1;￿2) and (￿￿
0;￿￿
1;￿￿
2) depend on the payo⁄ structure V . Understanding
their speci￿c values is certainly important within the context of any particular application. For our
5Clearly, whether ￿ is common knowledge or not is a restriction on P:
11purposes, however, what is important is only to register the following simple but general principle:
as long as agents have either no private information at all or private information regarding only
idiosyncratic shocks, then the equilibrium and e¢ cient actions for an agent are merely functions of
the agent￿ s forecasts of his own fundamental ￿i and the aggregate fundamental ￿ ￿.
Consider now the case that agents have private information regarding aggregate shocks. Be-
cause ￿ is not common knowledge, aggregate activity is not common knowledge either. As a result,
equilibrium and e¢ cient allocations depend, not only on the agents￿forecasts of the fundamentals,
but also on their forecasts of one another￿ s actions and beliefs. This insight is formalized in the
following proposition, which extends related results from Angeletos and Pavan (2007) to the more
general setting of this paper.6
Proposition 2. Suppose ￿ is not common knowledge, so that agents have private information on
aggregate shocks and face strategic uncertainty. There exist coe¢ cients ￿ < 1 and ￿￿ < 1 such that
the following are true:











while the e¢ cient allocation satis￿es
ki = ￿￿ ￿
Ei￿i;Ei￿ ￿
￿
+ ￿￿ ￿ Ei
￿
K ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿;￿ ￿
￿￿
: (8)
(ii) Let #1 ￿
R
E[￿j!]d￿(!) and ￿ #
1 ￿
R
E[￿ ￿j!]d￿(!) denote, respectively, the average ex-
pectation of one￿ s own fundamental and of the aggregate fundamental; for any n ￿ 2; let #n ￿
R




n￿1j!]d￿(!) denote the corresponding n-th order average expect-
ations; ￿nally, let ￿ #
0 ￿ ￿ ￿: The equilibrium is given by









(￿i ￿ ￿ ￿) +
1 X
n=1


















(￿i ￿ ￿ ￿) +
1 X
n=1




Part (i) highlights the dependence of equilibrium and e¢ cient allocations on beliefs regarding





is the action agent i would have taken in equilibrium had information about aggreg-
6When ￿ has the cardinality of the continuum, the e¢ cient allocation is determined only for P-almost all !; we
ignore this quali￿cation in the rest of the paper.
12ate shocks been common. How much an agent deviates from this benchmark when information is





, which is his forecast of the deviation of the other agents￿
average action from this benchmark, weighted by the coe¢ cient ￿. In this sense, the coe¢ cient
￿ captures how much each individual cares about aligning his action with that of others, or equi-
valently the private value of forecasting one another￿ s actions; it identi￿es the degree of strategic
complementarity featured in equilibrium. Similarly, the coe¢ cient ￿￿ in condition (8) captures how
much society would like agents to align their choices, or equivalently the social value of forecasting
one another￿ s actions; it identi￿es the degree of complementarity featured in e¢ cient allocation.
Part (ii) then translates the result in terms of the hierarchy of beliefs (forecasts of the forecasts of
others). To better understand this result, consider the special case where the shocks are perfectly
correlated (￿i = ￿ ￿ for all i), in which case the last term in (9) and (10) disappears. If ￿ had
been common knowledge, the equilibrium and e¢ cient allocations would have been, respectively,
ki = ￿0 + (￿1 + ￿2)Ei￿ ￿ and ki = ￿￿
0 + (￿￿
1 + ￿￿
2)Ei￿ ￿. Now that ￿ is not common knowledge,
the equilibrium and e¢ cient allocations have the same structure, except that now Ei￿ ￿ has been
replaced by a weighted average of the entire hierarchy of beliefs about the underlying aggregate
shocks. This is because an agent￿ s ￿rst-order belief of the aggregate shock is no longer su¢ cient to
forecast aggregate activity; the agent needs to forecast the forecasts of others. The terms ￿ and ￿￿
then determine, respectively, the sensitivity of equilibrium and e¢ cient allocations to higher-order
beliefs: the higher the degree of complementarity, the stronger the impact of higher-order beliefs
relative to ￿rst-order beliefs.7
These results permit us to formalize a type of ine¢ ciency that resembles the one alluded by
Keynes in his beauty-contest metaphor for ￿nancial markets￿ an ine¢ ciency that can emerge only
when agents face strategic uncertainty and that is thus ruled out by either the Ramsey or the
Mirrlees literature.8
Corollary 1. When agents have private information about aggregate shocks, then, and only then, an
ine¢ ciency can emerge due to the discrepancy between the private and the social value of forecasting
one another￿ s actions and beliefs.
To further appreciate this ine¢ ciency, it is useful to spell out its implications for the reaction of
the economy to the underlying fundamentals and noise. Suppose that productivities are perfectly
7Note that, for all n; #
n and ￿ #
n are measurable in ￿. When ￿ is common knowledge, then #
n = E[￿j￿] = E[￿ ￿j￿] =
￿ #
n = Ei[￿ ￿] for all n and all i; this is simply because all information regarding aggregate shocks is common. This
explains why, when ￿ is common knowledge, (9) and (10) reduce, respectively, to (5) and (6).
8To rule out degenerate cases that render the degree of complementarity irrelevant for behavior even when ￿ is not
common knowledge, we henceforth assume that the information structure (￿;F;P) is ￿regular￿in the following sense:
for any two payo⁄ structures V and V
0 that lead to the same ￿ but di⁄erent ￿; whenever ￿ is not common knowledge,
the equilibrium of the economy (V;￿;F;P) is di⁄erent than that of the economy (V
0;￿;F;P) for a non-zero-measure
subset of ￿. When shocks ￿i are perfectly correlated, a su¢ cient condition for this is that there exists a subset ￿ ￿ of ￿,
with non-zero probability measure under P, such that E[￿ #
nj!] > E[￿ #
nj!
0] for all n and for all !;!
0 2 ￿ ￿: For Gaussian
information structures like the one described below, this condition is trivially satis￿ed￿ indeed with ￿ ￿ = ￿￿ unless
the prior is completely uninformative and there is no public signal.
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; s 2 f1;:::;ng, are independent of one another
and of ￿ ￿; but can be correlated across agents (so that there is some common noise). Next, let
^ K denote the projection of the equilibrium K on ￿ ￿. Then, V ar( ^ K) measures the component of
volatility that is driven by fundamentals ( ￿fundamental volatility￿ ); V ar(K ￿ ^ K) measures the
component that is driven by noise (￿non-fundamental volatility￿ ); and the ratio of the two de￿nes
the ￿signal-to-noise ratio￿ in aggregate activity. Because a stronger complementarity tilts the
equilibrium towards the signals with relatively more correlated noise, the following is true.
Proposition 3. Consider the Gaussian information structure described above. The equilibrium
signal-to-noise ratio in aggregate activity is ine¢ ciently low if and only if ￿ > ￿￿.
We conclude that the condition ￿ > ￿￿ is synonymous to any of the following: (i) excessive
concern for forecasting the forecasts of others; (ii) overreaction to sources of information with
highly correlated noise; and (iii) excessive non-fundamental volatility. Of course, how ￿ and ￿￿
compare, and hence whether the aforementioned ine¢ ciency is present, depends on the details of
the application. Therefore, one cannot fully appreciate this ine¢ ciency without a speci￿c context.
(See also the discussion in Section 5.4.) However, for the purposes of this paper, we can bypass
the details of the origins, and the precise interpretation, of this ine¢ ciency and instead focus on
its potential policy implications.
5 Policy
We now turn to policy. We ￿rst study how di⁄erent policies a⁄ect the incentives agents face when
they decide how to use their di⁄erent sources of information; this part generalizes the insights
illustrated in Section 2. We then identify the policy (or policies) that implement the e¢ cient use
of information as an equilibrium; this part establishes that the contingency on realized aggregate
activity is essential for optimality only when agents have private information regarding aggregate
shocks, further highlighting the contribution of our paper vis-a-vis the pertinent literature.
5.1 The equilibrium impact of the policy contingencies
Consider the following class of (possibly non-linear) tax-schedules that are contingent on ex post






where T : R2 ￿ R+ ￿ ￿ ! R: Without loss of optimality (as it will be clear soon), we restrict T





= G for all (K;￿ ￿) and Tkk +T￿￿ = 0; which is necessary and su¢ cient for the policy
to be budget-balanced for any possible strategy. Denoting the class of policies that satisfy these
properties by T , we have the following result. (To simplify the formulas, we normalize payo⁄s so
that Vkk = ￿1; see the Appendix for the more general case.)
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When ￿ is common knowledge, the equilibrium is given by




￿ ~ ￿0 + ~ ￿1Ei￿ + ~ ￿2Ei￿ ￿:
When instead ￿ is not common knowledge, the equilibrium is given by
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There are four instruments that permit the government to in￿ uence equilibrium allocations:
the level of taxation (as parametrized by Tk(0;0;0)); the non-linearity of the tax system (Tkk); the
contingency of marginal taxes on realized aggregate productivity (Tk￿ ￿); and their contingency on
realized aggregate activity (TkK). While all these instruments matter for equilibrium outcomes,
each one has a distinctive role. Tkk is the only instrument that permits the government to control
~ ￿1; the sensitivity of the agents￿actions to their information about their own productivity shocks.
For given Tkk, the only instrument that permits the government to control ~ ￿; the degree of com-
plementarity is TkK, the contingency on aggregate activity. For given Tkk and TkK; the instrument
that permits the government to control ~ ￿2, the sensitivity of individual actions to variations in
aggregate productivity, is Tk￿ ￿. Finally, Tk(0;0;0) controls merely the average level of activity.
These results help generalize the insights delivered in the investment example of Section 2.
Note that a higher Tk￿ ￿ reduces ~ ￿2 but does not a⁄ect ~ ￿, whereas a higher TkK reduces both ~ ￿2
and ~ ￿. This means that the contingency on the realized fundamentals has a symmetric e⁄ect
across all sources of information, whereas the contingency on realized aggregate activity has an
asymmetric e⁄ect: a higher TkK penalizes the agents relative more when they react to sources of
information that are relatively better predictors of aggregate activity (or, equivalently, when they
15react to variation in higher-order beliefs). In other words, the contingency of the tax schedule on
the realized aggregate activity replicates the same incentive e⁄ects as a direct preferential tax on
certain sources of information.
These results hold for arbitrary information structures, but they are most clearly illustrated in
the case of a Gaussian information structure.
Proposition 5. Consider the Gaussian information structure described in Section 4. Other things
equal, a higher Tk￿ ￿ reduces fundamental and non-fundamental volatility proportionally, whereas a
higher TkK has a disproportional e⁄ect on non-fundamental volatility. The signal-to-noise ratio in
aggregate activity is thus independent of Tk￿ ￿ but increases with TkK.
These results suggest that the contingency on aggregate activity is the key to correcting the
particular type of ine¢ ciency that we documented in Section 4. We verify this intuition next.
5.2 Implementation of the e¢ cient decentralized use of information
We now turn to the existence and characterization of a policy T￿ 2 T that implements the e¢ cient
allocation as an equilibrium. Whenever such a policy exist, the very de￿nition of the e¢ cient
allocation guarantees that there is no other policy that can improve upon T￿: This is true even for
policies that violate budget balance, or even if one allows the agents to send arbitrary messages to
the planner and the planner to make transfers contingent on these messages; what is essential is
only that the planner does not send any information to the agents before they make their choices.
Proposition 6. (i) When ￿ is common knowledge, the e¢ cient allocation can always be imple-
mented with a policy that is contingent only on the fundamentals: it is without loss of optimality to
set TkK = 0. (ii) When instead ￿ is not common knowledge, the contingency on aggregate activity
becomes essential for e¢ ciency: the optimal TkK is uniquely determined for all economies and it is
non-zero for all but a zero-measure set of payo⁄ functions.
The proof of this result follows from Proposition 4. First, note that there exists a unique Tkk
such that ~ ￿1 = ￿￿
1: Given this Tkk; there exists a unique TkK such that ~ ￿ = ￿￿: But then there
also exist a unique Tk￿ ￿ such that ~ ￿2 = ￿￿
2 and a unique Tk (0;0;0) such that ~ ￿0 = ￿￿
0. All other
parameters of the policy are then pinned down by budget balance. Next, note that, when ￿ is
common knowledge, the policy implements the e¢ cient allocation if and only if it induces ~ ￿ = ￿￿;
the degree of complementarity ~ ￿ is irrelevant. In this case there is one degree of indeterminacy in
the optimal policy in the sense that there are multiple combinations of TkK and Tk￿ ￿ that induce
~ ￿ = ￿￿: It is thus without any loss to set TkK = 0: In fact, this is true for any implementable
allocation, not just the e¢ cient one: when ￿ is common knowledge, any allocation that can be
implemented with a policy that has TkK 6= 0 can also be implemented with a policy that has
TkK = 0:
16When, instead, ￿ is not common knowledge, the policy implements the e¢ cient allocation if and
only if it induces both ~ ￿ = ￿￿ and ~ ￿ = ￿￿.9 In this case the optimal policy is uniquely determined
and, for all but a zero (Lebesgue) measure set of payo⁄ functions, it features TkK 6= 0. Moreover,
the optimal TkK tends to increase with the gap between ￿ and ￿￿, which means that the optimal
TkK is higher the more severe the ine¢ ciency in the signal-to-noise ratio in equilibrium activity.
We conclude that, whereas the e¢ cient allocation can always be implemented with a tax sched-
ule that is contingent merely on the realized aggregate fundamentals when information regarding
aggregate shocks is common (as in the Ramsey and Mirrlees literatures), the contingency on real-
ized aggregate activity becomes necessary for optimality once such information is dispersed. This
is because, when information regarding the aggregate fundamentals is common, aggregate activity
can be a function of only this information, and hence a contingency of the policy on aggregate
activity has exactly the same incentives e⁄ects as a contingency on the aggregate fundamentals. In
contrast, when information regarding the aggregate fundamentals is dispersed, the contingency on
aggregate activity has a di⁄erential e⁄ect than the contingency on aggregate fundamentals, for it
is this contingency, and only this one, that can correct any excessive sensitivity of the equilibrium
to noise relative to the fundamentals.
5.3 Implementation with measurement error
The preceding analysis has assumed that the government can perfectly observe the agents￿activity
and aggregate productivity at the time taxes are collected. We now consider a variant that intro-
duces measurement error; apart from being more realistic, this will prove useful in the dynamic
extension of Section 6, where activity and fundamentals are observed with noise in each period.
We consider both additive and multiplicative measurement error. In the additive case, the
government￿ s measurement of agent i￿ s activity is ~ ki = ki + ￿ + ￿i, while it￿ s measurement of the
aggregate fundamental is ~ ￿ = ￿ ￿+&; where ￿ and & are common noise, while ￿i is idiosyncratic noise.
In the multiplicative case, the respective signals are ~ ki = ki(1 + ￿ + ￿i) and ~ ￿ = ￿ ￿(1 + &). In either
case, we let ~ K and ~ ￿k denote, respectively, the cross-sectional average and dispersion of ~ k: We then
consider tax schedules of the form ￿i = T(~ ki; ~ K; ~ ￿k;~ ￿); where the function T is assumed to satisfy
the same properties as before.
Proposition 7. Propositions 5 and 6 are robust to measurement error.
To understand this result, note that
EiT(~ ki; ~ K; ~ ￿k;~ ￿) = EiT(ki;K;￿k;￿ ￿) + SOT;
where SOT are second-order terms that capture the impact of the risk introduced by measurement
9That e¢ ciency obtains only if ~ ￿ = ￿
￿ is true under the regularity condition introduced in footnote 8.
17error. (The ￿rst-order terms vanish because these errors have zero means.) When the measurement
error is additive, SOT is independent of ki, which means that such measurement error does not
interfere at all with the incentives provided by the tax system. When, instead, the measurement
error is multiplicative, it does impact incentives. However, by appropriately adjusting the policy,
the government can fully undo the incentive e⁄ects of the noise. The details of the optimal policy
then depend on the measurement error, but the e¢ cient allocation remains implementable and the
contingency on K remains essential only when agents have private information on aggregate shocks.
5.4 Discussion/applications
The analysis has established three key results that provide general guidance about the role of policy
in environments with dispersed information on aggregate shocks:
￿ The contingency of the policy on aggregate fundamentals has a symmetric e⁄ect on the use
of all sources of information, while the contingency on aggregate activity has an asymmetric
e⁄ect, penalizing relatively more the use of those sources that have highly correlated noise.
￿ The dispersion of information regarding aggregate shocks can introduce an ine¢ ciency that
is absent in either the Ramsey or the Mirrlees literature; this ine¢ ciency manifests itself as
excessive non-fundamental volatility.
￿ The contingency of the policy on aggregate activity is essential for optimality only in the
presence of the aforementioned ine¢ ciency.
Within our framework, the aforementioned ine¢ ciency can be formalized by the gap between
two coe¢ cients. The ￿rst one, ￿; identi￿es the degree of complementarity featured in equilibrium;
the second, ￿￿; identi￿es the degree of complementarity featured in e¢ cient allocations. In the
Appendix we further show that one can interpret a lower ￿￿ as a higher social aversion to non-
fundamental volatility. A more complete characterization and interpretation of these coe¢ cients
requires restricting attention to a speci￿c application: one needs to look at the primitive preferences,
technologies, and market interactions that are hidden behind our reduced-form payo⁄ V .
For example, consider the competitive economy discussed in Section 3. In this economy, pro-
duction choices are strategic substitutes (￿ < 0). this is because a higher aggregate production of
good 2 reduces the equilibrium price of that good, which in turn reduces the individual incentive to
produce. At the same time, the absence of monopolistic power and of any other friction than the
dispersion of information guarantees that there is no ine¢ ciency in the use of information (￿￿ = ￿),
thereby leaving no room for policy intervention. In contrast, in the beauty-contest model of Morris
and Shin (2002), agents engage in a game that induces a positive complementarity in equilibrium
18(￿ > 0). Because this game is zero-sum, this complementarity is not warranted from a social per-
spective (￿￿ = 0). It then follows from our results that, for that model, the optimal policy features
a positive contingency on aggregate activity (TkK > 0).
Next, consider Angeletos, Lorenzoni and Pavan (2007). That paper studies the two-way inter-
action between the real and the ￿nancial sector of a micro-founded economy in which entrepreneurs
and ￿nancial traders have dispersed information regarding the pro￿tability of a new technology. Be-
cause high aggregate investment is ￿good news￿for pro￿tability, asset prices increase with aggregate
investment. Because ￿rms￿incentives to invest in turn increase with asset prices, an endogenous
complementarity emerges in the investment decisions of the entrepreneurs. In e⁄ect, the entrepren-
eurs play of reduced-form game in which ￿ > 0.10 Angeletos, Lorenzoni and Pavan (2007) proceed
to show that this endogenous complementarity is a source of ine¢ ciency; in e⁄ect, they show that
￿ > ￿￿ in their economy. They then adapt the results of this paper to identify the policy that can
correct this ine¢ ciency.
Finally, consider Angeletos and La￿ O (2008), Hellwig (2005), and Lorenzoni (2008). These
papers consider dispersed-information variants of the class of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic economies
that is now canonical for business-cycle theory. These models cannot be directly nested in our
linear-quadratic framework. Nevertheless, the equilibrium and e¢ cient allocations of this class of
models has a log-linear structure quite similar to the one considered here. In fact, an analogue of
Proposition 2 continues to hold once one makes two adjustments: ￿rst, ki must now be interpreted
as the logarithm of the relevant production or pricing decision; second, the coe¢ cients ￿0 and ￿￿
0
now depend on the level of uncertainty, due to risk aversion. The coe¢ cients ￿ and ￿￿ are then
determined by the elasticity of substitution across di⁄erent goods, the curvature of the production
function, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. Angeletos
and La￿ O (2008) establish that ￿ = ￿￿ as long as nominal prices are ￿ exible or monetary policy
replicates the ￿ exible-price allocations. It follows that there is no ine¢ ciency in the equilibrium
use of information, and hence no room for policy intervention, as long as information is exogenous.
To recap, the micro-foundations of any particular application are essential for understanding
the determinants of the equilibrium and e¢ cient allocations and hence for fully appreciating what
determines the need for policy intervention in the ￿rst place. However, the general principles derived
in this paper do not hinge on the speci￿c micro-foundations of the application under examination.
We conclude with a quali￿cation of our result regarding the necessity of making the policy
contingent on aggregate activity: if ￿, or any su¢ cient statistic of it became common knowledge at
the time taxes are collected, the e¢ cient allocation could also be implemented with a tax schedule
10The payo⁄ structure of that game is endogenous; importantly, because the equilibrium asset prices depend on the
information structure, the complementarity also depends on the information structure. Nevertheless, this property
does not pose any di¢ culty for our policy exercise. Indeed, none of our results is a⁄ected if we let the reduced-form
payo⁄ function V ￿ and hence also the coe¢ cients ￿ and ￿
￿￿ depend on the underlying information structure.
19that is contingent on ￿, or the su¢ cient statistic, rather than K. This observation is obvious but
important to keep in mind when studying applications. In applied work, it is often convenient
to assume a very stark Gaussian information structure, one with a purely private signal (whose
noise is uncorrelated across agents) and a purely public signal (which is common knowledge). In
this case, aggregate activity is only a function of the true fundamental ￿ and the public signal.
It then follows that there is no loss of optimality in making the policy contingent on ￿ and the
public signal, instead of making it contingent on ￿ and K. However, note that once one perturbs
the information structure so as to introduce some unobserved common noise in the agents￿private
information, then one can no more replicate the contingency on K with a contingency on the public
signal. Moreover, it is unclear how one could measure the public signal in practice; this signal is
just a convenient modeling device meant to capture a variety of common (or correlated) sources
of information that may be available to the agents but not necessarily to the government. In this
sense, the implementations we have considered in this paper are both more robust to the details of
the information structure and easier to use in practice.
6 A dynamic extension with endogenous learning
In this section we consider a dynamic variant of the baseline framework. This serves two goals.
First, it brings the framework closer to macro applications. Second, and most importantly for our
purposes, it lets agents observe signals of the aggregate activity in the economy. These signals are
proxies for macro data, ￿nancial prices, and other channels of social learning. This extension thus
permit us to study how the policies we have identi￿ed can improve the e¢ ciency of social learning.
6.1 Set up
Time is discrete, indexed by t 2 f0;1;:::;Ng; for arbitrary N. In each period t, each agent i chooses
a level of consumption, ci;t, a position in a riskless discount bond, bi;t; and some action, ki;t; the
latter, which we can interpret as e⁄ort or investment in a risky technology, is the key economic
decision. Let Kt and ￿t denote the mean and the dispersion of activity in period t; and ~ ￿t the
productivity in period t (which, for simplicity, is henceforth assumed to be identical across agents).
The latter is given by ~ ￿t = ￿+at; where ￿ ￿ N(￿￿;￿2
￿) is a permanent component and at ￿ N(0;￿2
a)
is a transitory component (i.i.d. across time).
At the beginning of each period t; agents publicly observe ~ ￿t, but cannot tell apart the perman-
ent and the transitory component. In addition, agents observe noisy public signals of past activity,
namely ~ Kt￿1 = Kt￿1 +￿t and ~ ￿t￿1 = ￿t￿1 +￿￿;t; where ￿t ￿ N(0;￿2
￿;t) is a common measurement
error and ￿￿;t is the dispersion of idiosyncratic measurement errors; these measurement errors are
20independent across time, and independent of any other random variable.11 Finally, agents receive
an exogenous private signal xi;t = ￿ + ￿i;t and an exogenous common signal yt = ￿ + "t; where the
noises ￿i;t ￿ N(0;￿2
x;t) and "t ￿ N(0;￿2
y;t) are independent of any other random variable.
The entire information of agent i in period t is then summarized in a vector !i;t, which can be
recursively constructed by
!i;t = (xi;t;~ ￿t; ~ Kt￿1; ~ ￿t￿1;!i;t￿1):
We let ￿t denote the set of all possible realizations of !i;t; ￿t the cross-sectional distribution of
!i;t; and ￿t the set of all possible such distributions. For any strategy kt : ￿t ! R followed in
period t, aggregate activity is given by Kt(￿t) =
R
￿t kt(!t)d￿t(!t) and its dispersion by ￿t(￿t) =
R
￿t(kt(!t) ￿ Kt(￿))2d￿t(!t). To economize on notation, we once again suppress the dependence
of ki;t on !i;t and that of Kt and ￿t on ￿t, and let Ei;t denote the expectation conditional on
!i;t. Finally, we note that social learning can obtain only because of the dispersion of information
regarding aggregate shocks: if ￿t had been common knowledge, nothing could be learned from
signals of past activity.





where U(￿) is a real-valued function and where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor. (We allow U to
depend on ki;t to capture cases where the latter represents e⁄ort.) The agent￿ s period￿t budget,
on the other hand, is given by
ci;t + G(ki;t) + qtbi;t = F(ki;t￿1; ~ Kt￿1; ~ ￿t￿1;~ ￿t) + bi;t￿1 ￿ ￿i;t;
where qt denotes the period-t price of discount bonds (the reciprocal of the risk-free rate) and ￿i;t
denotes the period-t taxes the agent pays to the government.12 The function G can be interpreted
as the cost of period-t investment, while the function F can be interpreted as the income received
in period t. The latter is allowed to depend on others activity, capturing the same kind of external
payo⁄ e⁄ects as in the baseline framework. This dependence is ￿noised-up￿through the measure-
ment errors in ~ Kt￿1 and ~ ￿t￿1 only to ensure that the observation of own income does not perfectly
reveal past activity and thereby ￿.13
11The analysis easily extends to the case where agents observe private signals of aggregate activity in addition to
the aforementioned public ones; we drop the private signals only for expositional simplicity.
12For period t = N + 1, we impose that ki;N+1 = bi;N+1 = 0.
13We could remove these measurement errors and still guarantee that aggregate activity does not perfectly reveal
￿ by introducing private signals with correlated rather than purely idiosyncratic noises. As anticipated earlier, the
contingency of policy on aggregate activity is the key instrument for controlling the signal-to-noise ratio in aggregate
activity; the precise source of noise need to be crucial.
21This framework is quite ￿ exible. For example, a stylized version of the neoclassical growth
model with no labor and with convex investment costs is nested by letting U (c;k) = c; F (k;K;￿;￿) =
￿k, and G(k) = k+￿k2; for some constant ￿ > 0. In this particular case, informational externalities
would be the only source of ine¢ ciency. Adding external payo⁄ e⁄ects through F may then stylize
a variety of market or non-market interactions, as in the baseline framework.14 The informational
role of any prices or other forms of social learning that may be associated with such interactions
are then mimicked by the information role of ~ Kt.
To keep the analysis tractable, we assume that U is linear in consumption: U(c;k) = c￿H(k);
for some function H. This restriction rules out redistributive concerns. It further ensures that
the bond market clears if and only if qt = ￿ (in which case the demand for the risk-free bond is






ki;t; ~ Kt; ~ ￿t;~ ￿t+1
￿
;
where the function V is now given by
V (k;K;￿;￿) ￿ ￿[G(k) + H(k)] + ￿F (k;K;￿;￿):
We also assume that V is a quadratic function, satisfying the same properties with respect to
(k;K;￿;￿) as the function V in the baseline framework. Along with the assumption that all exo-
genous random variables are Gaussian, this will guarantee that all endogenous signals are also
Gaussian in equilibrium (or, more generally, for any linear strategy), which is essential for main-
taining the analysis tractable.15
6.2 Equilibrium
The essential di⁄erence between the economy of this section and the one of the baseline framework
is the endogeneity of information: the strategy agents follow in period t determines how much
information about ￿ is contained in ~ Kt, which in turn a⁄ects behavior and welfare in periods t + 1
14Clearly, we could also allow the functions H and G to depend on (K;￿;￿); so as to capture externalities in leisure,
pecuniary externalities in the cost of investment, and so on.
15The framework we have introduced in this section is essentially a hybrid of our baseline framework, which allowed
for payo⁄ interactions but abstracted from social learning, and the model in Vives (1997), which allowed for social
learning but abstracted from payo⁄ interactions. In particular, we can nest Vives￿ s framework, and its close cousin in
Amador and Weill (2007), by setting V (k;K;￿;￿) = ￿(￿ ￿k)
2. Combining social learning with payo⁄ interactions is
not merely for the sake of generality; it can be crucial for the normative properties of the class of environments that
we are interested in. For example, the key result in Amador and Weill (2007, 2008) is that public information can
reduce welfare by reducing the speed of social learning; this result relies on having a positive social value for social
learning in the ￿rst place, which need not be the case once one allows for payo⁄ interactions (see also Chapter 3 in
Vives, 2008, for the same point). In contrast, as it will become clear, our policy results do not hinge on the details
of the underlying payo⁄ structure.
22on. However, this informational externality does not alter private incentives. The following then is
a direct extension of the equilibrium results of the benchmark framework.
Proposition 8. There exist a linear function ￿ : R ! R and a coe¢ cient ￿ such that the equilib-
rium satis￿es
ki;t = ￿(Ei;t￿) + ￿ ￿ Ei;t [Kt ￿ ￿(￿)] (11)
This result does not require the information structure to be Gaussian. However, once we restrict
￿ and the exogenous noises to be Gaussian, this result ensures that the information contained in the
signals of past activity is also Gaussian. All the information￿ exogenous and endogenous￿ that is
available in any given period can then be summarized in two su¢ cient statistics, one for the private
and the other for the public signals; the dynamics of these two statistics admit a simple recursive
structure; and the equilibrium strategy reduces to an a¢ ne combination of the two.
Proposition 9. The equilibrium strategy is given by










The variables Xi;t and Yt are su¢ cient statistics for all the private and public information about ￿
that is available to agent i in period t, while ￿x
t and ￿
y
t are their respective precisions. The su¢ cient

































































Finally, the initial conditions are Xi;0 = 0; Yi;0 = ￿; ￿0 = 0, ￿x




The intuition for condition (12) is simple. Note that ￿t represents the relative sensitivity of the
23equilibrium strategy to the su¢ cient statistic Xi;t of the private information of an agent. For given
degree of complementarity ￿, this sensitivity increases with the precision of private information and
decreases with the precision of public information. At the same, for given precisions, a higher ￿ tilts
the equilibrium strategy away from private information and towards public information, as agents
￿nd it optimal to better align their choices. Conditions (13)-(15), on the other hand, describe the
dynamics of information: agents update the su¢ cient statistics inherited from period t ￿ 1 with
the new exogenous and endogenous signals observed in period t. Naturally, how much these signals
are weighted depends on their respective precisions; and for the same reasons as in the benchmark
models, it also depends on the degree of complementarity, ￿, featured in equilibrium.
The key novel property then to notice is that the precision of information available in one
period depends on the strategy followed in previous periods. In particular, for all t; the precision
of the endogenous signal ~ yt and thereby the precision ￿
y
t of the su¢ cient statistic Yt is increasing in
￿t￿1: This is because the informative content of the signals of aggregate activity is higher the more
sensitive the strategies of the agents to their private information. This is an important informational
externality that the equilibrium fails to internalize in the absence of policy intervention.
6.3 E¢ ciency
We now seek to identify the strategy that maximizes ex-ante utility taking into account the afore-
mentioned informational externality. Unlike the case with exogenous information considered in the
benchmark model, here we have to restrict attention to strategies that are linear in the history of
available private signals;16 without this restriction, the endogenous signals are no longer Gaussian
and the analysis becomes intractable. We can then characterized the e¢ cient allocation as follows.
Proposition 10. There exists a linear function ￿￿ : R ! R and a scalar ￿￿ such that the e¢ cient
linear allocation is given by
ki;t = ￿￿ (￿￿￿

























for all t < N; while ￿￿￿








: Xi;t and Yt are su¢ cient statistics for




16By this we mean the following: let ht denote the public history in period t, which is constructed recursively by
ht = (~ ￿t; ~ Kt￿1; ~ ￿t￿1;ht￿1); we impose that, for all t and all all !i;t, kt (!i;t) = Pt (ht) +
Pt
￿=1 Qt;￿xi;￿; for some
deterministic function Pt and some deterministic coe¢ cients fQt;￿g
t
￿=1. Note that we do not impose linearity in the
public signals, nor linearity in the su¢ cient statistics; the property stated in Proposition 10 that the e¢ cient strategy
can be expressed as a linear function of the su¢ cient statistics Xi;t and Yt is a result, not an assumption.
24respective precisions; these su¢ cient statistics are obtained recursively using (13)-(15), replacing
￿t with ￿￿￿
t and ￿ with ￿￿.
To appreciate this result, consider, as a reference point, what the e¢ cient allocation would
have been in period t if all information in period t + 1 had been exogenous. This case is nested
here by letting ￿￿;t+1 = 1 (in￿nite measurement error in the signal of aggregate activity observed










This is the same as with equilibrium, except that ￿ has being replaced with ￿￿. Any di⁄erence
between the equilibrium and the e¢ cient use of information could then originate only in payo⁄
e⁄ects, as in the benchmark model.17
Consider now the implications of informational externalities (￿￿;t+1 < 1): The optimal weight























￿;t+1 > 0.18 It follows that ￿￿￿
t > ￿￿
t:
That is, relative to the case with exogenous information, the e¢ cient use of information is now
tilted away from the public signals (here summarized in Yt) and towards the private signals (here
summarized in Xi;t). This is intuitive. Increasing the sensitivity of actions to Xi;t increases the
precision of the information contained in the signals of past aggregate activity in period t + 1.
Along the e¢ cient allocation, this necessarily increases the present-value welfare from period t + 1
onward.19 Of course, doing so comes at a welfare cost during period t: the weight that maximizes
the period￿t ￿ ow welfare is simply ￿￿
t. However, the envelope theorem guarantees that, starting
from this reference point, the marginal cost of increasing ￿t in terms of period￿t welfare is zero,
while the marginal bene￿t in terms of welfare from period t+1 and on is strictly positive. Together
with the concavity of the planner￿ s problem, this implies that the new optimum is achieved at a
point ￿￿￿
t strictly higher than ￿￿
t. The ￿wedge￿￿￿t+1 in (16) captures precisely the (discounted)
social bene￿t of doing so, that is, the informational externality.
Here, it is important to note the following. Although the e¢ cient allocation is necessarily more
sensitive to private information than what it would have been if learning was absent, this does not
17Another way to see this is the following: if information had been exogenous, the e¢ cient allocation would satisfy
ki;t = ￿
￿ (Ei;t￿)+￿
￿￿Ei;t [Kt ￿ ￿
￿ (￿)]; where both the function ￿ and the coe¢ cient ￿
￿ are determined by the payo⁄
function V , as in the benchmark model.
18The second-order conditions of the e¢ cient allocation guarantee that ￿t+1 is small enough so that the denomin-
ator of ￿t is also positive.
19Here it is important to note that increasing the precision of either exogenous or endogenous signals need not be
welfare-improving under the equilibrium allocation, but it is always so under the e¢ cient allocation; we will come
back to this point in Section 7.
25mean that it is also more sensitive than the equilibrium allocation. In other words, the presence
of informational externalities does not necessarily mean that the equilibrium features too little
learning￿ whether this is the case depends on the payo⁄ structure. Indeed, in environments where
there are no payo⁄ interdependencies (e.g., Banerjee, 1992; Vives, 1997; Amador and Weill, 2007),
the equilibrium sensitivity to private information is e¢ cient when information is exogenous and, by
implication, it is ine¢ ciently low when information is endogenous. However, in environments with
payo⁄ interdependencies, the equilibrium sensitivity to private information can be too high when
information is exogenous and, by implication, can remain too high when information is endogenous.
When this is the case, the equilibrium features too much, not too little, social learning.20
Finally, note that the e¢ cient allocation might feature ￿￿￿
t > 1 if ￿t+1 is su¢ ciently high. That
is, a su¢ ciently strong informational externality could, not only reduce the sensitivity of activity
to public information, but even make it change sign. We can easily accommodate this possibility
in Propositions 11 and 12 below, but it would complicate the exposition because we would have
to consider two cases depending on whether the sensitivity to public information changes sign.
Moreover, we do not expect this possibility to be relevant for applications. We thus opt to rule it
out, without any serious loss of generality.
Assumption. The e¢ cient allocation features ￿￿￿
t 2 (0;1):
The following alternative representation of the e¢ cient allocation then helps translate the
impact of the informational externality in terms of an implicit desired degree of complementarity
in the agents￿choices.
Proposition 11. There exists a unique sequence f￿￿￿
t g
N
t=1 ; with ￿￿￿
t < ￿￿ for all t < N; such that
the e¢ cient allocation satis￿es
ki;t = ￿￿ (Ei;t￿) + ￿￿￿
t ￿ Ei;t [Kt ￿ ￿￿ (￿)]: (17)
As in the case without informational externalities, the weight ￿￿￿
t in condition (17) summarizes
how much society would like the agents to factor their expectations of other agents￿choices in their
own choices. Unlike the case without informational externalities, this weight now depends on the
information structure. Nevertheless, condition (17) remains a valid and insightful representation
of the optimal strategy: the result that ￿￿￿
t < ￿￿ highlights that having the agents internalize the
informational externality is isomorphic to having them perceive a lower complementarity in their
actions than the one they should have perceived had information been exogenous.
20Moreover, in this case the failure to internalize the informational externalities, other things equal, improves the
e¢ ciency of the equilibrium, for it balances the underlying payo⁄ externalities.
266.4 Policy
We are now ready to characterize optimal policy. We consider tax schemes that make the tax
paid by an agent in each period contingent on public information regarding the realized aggregate
activity and the realized aggregate fundamentals. In particular, the tax agent i pays in period t+1
on the investment he made in period t is contingent on ~ Kt; ~ ￿t; and ~ ￿t+1, all of which are public
information in period t + 1:
￿i;t+1 = Tt+1(ki;t; ~ Kt; ~ ￿t;~ ￿t+1); (18)
where Tt+1 is a quadratic function satisfying the same restrictions as those speci￿ed in the baseline
framework. The existence and uniqueness of the optimal policy then follows essentially from the
same argument as the one with measurement error considered in the baseline framework. Along
with the fact that ￿￿￿
t < ￿￿ in all periods (except the very last one), this gives the following result.
Proposition 12. There exists a unique policy that implements the e¢ cient allocation. The optimal
TkK is higher than what it would have been in the absence of informational externalities.
Once again, the optimal policy does not require any informational advantage on the side of
the government: it merely depends on the agents anticipating when they make their decisions
that the marginal tax they will pay in the future will be contingent on public information about
aggregate economic conditions.21 The ￿nal goal may now be di⁄erent, but the key instrument is
the same: by e⁄ectively subsidizing the use of sources of information that have little correlated
noise (the su¢ cient statistic Xi;t here), a higher contingency of the tax schedule on the realized
aggregate activity now also guarantees faster social learning. The type of policies we have identi￿ed
in this paper thus permit to correct, not only the ine¢ ciency in non-fundamental volatility that we
documented in the baseline framework, but also the ine¢ ciency that emerges when agents fail to
internalize how their choices a⁄ect the aggregation of information in the economy.
21There is a slight imprecision here. To implement (18), the tax authorities must observe ki;t for each i. But
then, in the absence of other frictions, the government could perfectly uncover Kt. We can bypass this uninteresting
complication in at least three ways. First, we can assume that there is a large number of tax bureaucrats, each of
whom is e⁄ective in monitoring the choices or incomes of speci￿c individuals, so that they can collect taxes according
to (18), but are not good in aggregating and communicating information to the central tax authority, so that the
latter only gets to observe Kt with measurement error. Moreover, a random amount of total tax revenue is lost, so
that total tax revenue does not perfectly reveal Kt. Alternatively, we can introduce some ￿noise￿agents, who choose
their ki;t in a completely random way. Provided that the tax authorities can not tell apart these agents from the
￿rational￿ones, we can reinterpret Kt as the (unobserved) activity of the rational agents and ~ Kt as (observed) total
activity. Finally, we could have the tax paid by agent i be ￿i;t = T(~ ki;t; ~ Kt; ~ ￿t;~ ￿t+1), where ~ ki;t = ki;t +￿t +￿i;t and
where ￿it is idiosyncratic noise, and let the agent learn about the common measurement error ￿t from the observation
of his own ~ ki;t. We would then have to adjust some of the analysis in order to incorporate this additional source of
learning, but the key insights would remain largely una⁄ected. Indeed, as the variance of ￿i;t converges to in￿nity
relatively to that of all other noises, this source of learning becomes irrelevant and the results remain una⁄ected.
277 Implications for the social value of information
Throughout the analysis, we have ruled out policies that convey information to the agents. However,
because one of the roles of the government is precisely to collect information that is not readily
available to the market (think, e.g., of the macroeconomic data collected by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, the US Census Bureau, or the Federal Reserve Banks), it is important to understand
whether, and when, it is socially desirable to reveal such information to the market.
The answer to this question is non-trivial: in general, additional information may reduce
equilibrium welfare. However, this can not be the case if policy restores e¢ ciency in the equilibrium
use of information. This is because the equilibrium then coincides with the solution to a planning
problem where the planner directly controls how agents use their available information and can
thus guarantee that any additional information will be used at society￿ s best interest.
Proposition 13. In general, more precise information can reduce equilibrium welfare. However,
policies that restore e¢ ciency in the decentralized use of information also guarantee a positive social
value for any information disseminated by policy makers or other institutions.
This result gives guidance on how one can overcome, or at least alleviate, the kind of problems
considered in Morris and Shin (2002), Angeletos and Pavan (2007), and Amador and Weill (2007,
2008). These papers have identi￿ed situations in which equilibrium welfare may decrease with
the provision of public information; some have then used this possibility to make a case against
transparency in central bank communication. By restoring e¢ ciency in the decentralized use of
information, the policies we have identi￿ed here help guarantee that welfare increases with more
information. This is true no matter whether the initial ine¢ ciency originated in payo⁄ interac-
tions (as in Morris-Shin and Angeletos-Pavan) or informational externalities (as in Amador-Weill).
Moreover, whereas the pertinent literature has studied the optimality of central-bank transparency
largely in isolation from the corrective role of monetary policy, this result indicates that those two
aspects of policy making are far from orthogonal to one another.
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper we sought to identify policies that can control how agents use their dispersed sources
of information regarding commonly-relevant fundamentals, without requiring the government to
observe or collect the information that is dispersed in the economy. Our key result was that this
goal can be achieved by appropriately designing the contingencies of marginal taxes on public
information regarding the realized aggregate fundamentals and, most importantly, the realized
aggregate activity. While the former contingency has a symmetric e⁄ect across all sources of
information, the latter contingency has an asymmetric e⁄ect: it penalizes the agents relatively
28more when they react to sources of information that have highly correlated noise. An appropriate
design of the two contingencies then helps the government dampen the impact of noise without also
dampening the impact of fundamentals; improve how much the agents (or the government itself)
can learn through prices, macro data, and other indicators of aggregate activity; and guarantee
that welfare will increase with the provision of any additional information.
By introducing dispersed private information on aggregate shocks, our policy exercise made an
important methodological deviation from both the Ramsey tradition (which rules out any private
information) and the Mirrlees tradition (which allows for private information only about idiosyn-
cratic shocks). To highlight this, we showed that the contingency on realized aggregate activity is
essential for restoring e¢ ciency in our class of economies only when agents have dispersed private
information regarding aggregate shocks; when, instead, information regarding aggregate shocks is
common, it su¢ ces to make the tax schedule contingent on the aggregate fundamentals alone.
To isolate the particular type of ine¢ ciencies and policy objectives that we were interested in,
we ruled out any redistributive goal for taxation. In many applications, redistributive concerns
may interact with the policy objectives we studied. For example, the contingencies we have studied
a⁄ect how much idiosyncratic risk agents are exposed to; conversely, the progressivity of taxation
a⁄ects how much agents react to their private information regarding aggregate shocks. It is thus an
important direction for future research to extend our analysis to environments that allow for risk
aversion and redistributive concerns. However, this need not a⁄ect the key insights of the paper:
even when agents are risk averse, the contingency of taxes on aggregate activity remains a powerful
implicit tax on the use of sources of information that have highly correlated noise.22
In conclusion, the more general contribution of the paper is not the implementation of e¢ cient
allocations for a particular class of economies; rather, it is the identi￿cation of a simple, but power-
ful, combination of policy contingencies that can help the government manipulate the decentralized
use of information and thereby to control the non-fundamental volatility in aggregate activity and
the speed of social learning. This insight may be particularly relevant for the business cycle: not
only is it likely that a signi￿cant component of the business cycle is driven by correlated errors in
the information regarding aggregate productivity and demand conditions that is dispersed among
the ￿rms and consumers in the economy, but also the aggregation of this information through prices
and macro data may be far from perfect. Finally, this insight is clearly not limited to taxation:
the contingencies of monetary policy on realized macroeconomic outcomes could serve a similar
22To see this, consider a risk-averse variant of the example of Section 2: each agent chooses ki so as to maximize




i ￿ Ti and where U is a CARA utility. It is then easy to check that the contingency
of the tax on ￿ ￿ continues to have a symmetric e⁄ect on the sensitivity of investment to the available signals, while
the contingency on K continues to have an asymmetric e⁄ect; thus, once again, the latter contingency is the key to
controlling the signal-to-noise ratio in aggregate activity. See also Angeletos and La￿ O (2008) for an application in
which consumers have CRRA preferences and yet risk aversion does not interfere with the policy exercise of interest;
this is because dispersed information impact production choices without inducing idiosyncratic consumption risk.
29role as the tax contingencies studied in this paper. Further exploring how the policy objectives we
have identi￿ed in this paper ￿lter into the design of optimal ￿scal and monetary policies over the
business cycle is a promising direction for further research.23
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2. Step 1 proves the e¢ ciency results in Proposition 1 and in part
(i) of Proposition 2. Step 2 proves the corresponding equilibrium results. Finally, Step 3 proves
part (ii) of Proposition 2.
Step 1. The e¢ cient strategy is the solution to the optimization problem (the ￿planner￿ s
problem￿ ) of De￿nition 3. The strict concavity of V ensures that a solution to this problem exists
and is unique. Moreover, the solution can be characterized with standard Lagrangian methods.
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where ￿(￿) and ￿(￿) are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints in (4). The ￿rst














Vk(k(!);K(￿);￿;￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(￿) ￿ 2￿(￿)(k(!) ￿ K(￿))
￿
dP(￿;￿ ￿;￿j!) = 0 (A.3)




conditional on ! (i.e., the posterior of an
23See Angeletos and La￿ O (2008) for some work in this direction.
24Recall that, because V￿(￿) = V￿￿￿, the derivatives Vk and VK do not depend on ￿:
30agent about ￿;￿ ￿ and ￿). Using the facts that VK is linear, that K(￿) =
R
￿ k(!)d￿(!); and that






= ￿VK(K(￿);K(￿);E[￿ ￿j￿];E[￿ ￿j￿]):
Substituting the above into (A.3) and noting that E[￿ ￿j￿] = E[￿ ￿j￿;!] and hence E[E[￿ ￿j￿]j!] = E[￿ ￿j!];
we conclude that the strategy k : ￿ ! R is e¢ cient if and only if it satis￿es the following condition
for all ! 2 ￿ :
E
h





Finally, by the linearity of Vk, we have that Vk(k;K;￿;￿ ￿) = Vk(K;K;￿ ￿;￿ ￿)+Vkk(k￿K)+Vk￿(￿￿￿ ￿)
and hence the above can be restated as
Ei
h
Vk(K;K;￿ ￿;￿ ￿) + VK(K;K;￿ ￿;￿ ￿) + Vk￿(￿i ￿ ￿ ￿) + (Vkk + V￿￿)(k ￿ K)
i
= 0: (A.4)
Consider ￿rst the case where ￿ is common knowledge. Condition (A.4) reduces to
VK(K;K;Ei￿ ￿;Ei￿ ￿) + VK(K;K;Ei￿ ￿;Ei￿ ￿) + Vk￿(Ei￿i ￿ Ei￿ ￿) + (Vkk + V￿￿)(ki ￿ K) = 0: (A.5)
Let #1 ￿
R
E[￿j!]d￿(!) denote the cross-sectional average of Ei￿i. Because ￿ is common knowledge,
#1 is also common knowledge and Ei￿ ￿ = #1 for all i.25 Hence, aggregating (A.5) across agents gives
Vk(K;K;#1;#1) + VK(K;K;#1;#1) = 0: (A.6)
Condition (A.5) then reduces to
ki = K +
Vk￿
Vkk + V￿￿




Vk (0;0;0;0) + VK (0;0;0;0)









Vk￿ + Vk￿ ￿ + VK￿ + VK￿ ￿
￿(Vkk + 2VkK + VKK)
￿ ￿￿
1:
25Note that when ￿ is common knowledge, #
1 ￿ E[E[￿j!]j￿] = E[E[￿j!;￿]j￿] = E[￿j￿]; furthermore, because !






= E[E[￿jh;￿]j￿] = E[￿j￿]:
31Solving (A.6) and (A.7) then gives K = ￿￿
0 + (￿￿
1 + ￿￿
2)#1 and ki = K + ￿￿




2Ei￿ ￿; which gives the e¢ ciency result of Proposition 1.
Next, consider the case where ￿ is not common knowledge. Because both Vk and VK are linear,
the ￿rst two terms in condition (A.4) can be rewritten as
Vk(￿￿(￿ ￿;￿ ￿);￿￿(￿ ￿;￿ ￿);￿ ￿;￿ ￿) + VK(￿￿(￿ ￿;￿ ￿);￿￿(￿ ￿;￿ ￿);￿ ￿;￿ ￿)
+(Vkk + 2VkK + VKK)(K ￿ ￿￿(￿ ￿;￿ ￿)) = 0
By the de￿nition of ￿￿; the ￿rst two terms are zero. It follows that condition (A.4) reduces to
(Vkk + 2VkK + VKK)Ei(K ￿ ￿￿(￿ ￿;￿ ￿)) + Vk￿(Ei￿i ￿ Ei￿ ￿) + (Vkk + V￿￿)(ki ￿ EiK) = 0:
Rearranging, and letting
￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿
Vkk + 2VkK + VKK
Vkk + V￿￿
;
gives condition (8). Finally, Vkk + 2VkK + VKK < 0 by the concavity of V , while Vkk + V￿￿ < 0 by
assumption. This guarantees that ￿￿ < 1 and completes the proof of the e¢ ciency result in part
(i) of Proposition 2.





= 0: Furthermore, because V is quadratic in (k;K;￿), this
￿rst-order condition reduces to
Vk (0;0;0;0) + Vkkki + VkKEiK + Vk￿Ei￿i + Vk￿ ￿Ei￿ ￿ = 0: (A.8)
Consider ￿rst the case where ￿ is common knowledge. Aggregating (A.8) across all i gives
Vk (0;0;0;0) + (Vkk + VkK)K + (Vk￿ + Vk￿ ￿)#1 = 0: (A.9)
Condition (A.8) then reduces to
ki = K +
Vk￿
Vkk









Vk￿ + Vk￿ ￿
￿(Vkk + VkK)
￿ ￿1: (A.11)
Solving (A.9) and (A.10) for ki and K then gives K = ￿0+(￿1+￿2)#1 and ki = K+￿1(Ei￿i￿Ei￿ ￿) =
￿0 + ￿1Ei￿i + ￿2Ei￿ ￿: This establishes existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and gives condition
(5) of Proposition 1.
32Next consider the case that ￿ is not common knowledge. By the de￿nition of ￿,
Vk (0;0;0;0) + Vkk￿(￿;￿ ￿) + VkK￿(￿ ￿;￿ ￿) + Vk￿￿ + Vk￿ ￿￿ ￿ = 0:
Using the above, condition (A.8) reduces to
VkkEi
￿
ki ￿ ￿(￿;￿ ￿)
￿






and rearranging gives condition (7).
Clearly, the above argument establishes that (7) is both necessary and su¢ cient for any equi-
librium. What then remains to prove is that the equilibrium exists and is unique. This can be done
with the help of Step 1. First, note that an economy is parameterized by e ￿ (V;￿;F;P): Next,
note that for every V 2 V there exists a V 0 2 V such that such that the ￿￿ and ￿￿ corresponding
to V 0 coincide with the ￿ and ￿ corresponding to V: By comparing conditions (7) and (8), it is
immediate that the set of equilibrium strategies for the economy e = (V;￿;F;P) coincides with the
set of e¢ cient strategies for the economy e0 = (V 0;￿;F;P): The existence and uniqueness of the
equilibrium for economy e then follows from the existence and uniqueness of the e¢ cient allocation
of the economy e0; which we established in Step 1.
Step 3. Consider part (ii) of Proposition 2. We prove the result for the equilibrium; the proof
for the e¢ cient allocation is analogous. From (7),
ki = (1 ￿ ￿)(￿0 + (￿1 + ￿2)Ei￿ ￿) + ￿1(Ei￿i ￿ Ei￿ ￿) + ￿EiK; (A.13)
and therefore
K = (1 ￿ ￿)(￿0 + (￿1 + ￿2)￿ #





K = ￿0 + (￿1 + ￿2)
1 X
n=1




￿n￿1(#n ￿ ￿ #
n);
Substituting the above into (A.13) and rearranging gives the result. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3. For any signal s 2 f1;:::;ng; let ￿s ￿ ￿￿2
s denote its precision; let
￿s ￿ Corr(￿si;￿sj); for i 6= j; denote the correlation of the noise across any pair of agents; let ￿ ￿s
denote the mean realization of ￿si in the population (the common component of noise). We order
33the signals so that ￿1 > ￿2 > ::: > ￿s and let ￿0 ￿ ￿2
￿ denote the precision of the prior. By standard
Gaussian updating, the posterior of agent i about ￿ ￿ satis￿es




where ￿s = ￿s=￿ for s 2 f0;1;:::;ng and ￿ = ￿0 +
P
s ￿s, while his posterior about the common
noise in the s-th signal satis￿es
Ei￿ ￿s = ￿s(xis ￿ Ei￿):
Finally, from Proposition 2 we know that a strategy is an equilibrium if and only if it satis￿es
ki = (1 ￿ ￿)Ei￿(￿ ￿;￿ ￿) + ￿EiK: (A.14)
We now guess and verify that the equilibrium strategy is linear in the available signals.
Suppose there exist coe¢ cients (￿0;￿1;:::;￿n) such that




It then follows that













and therefore EiK = ￿0 +(
P
s ￿s(1 ￿ ￿s))Ei￿+
P
s (￿s￿sxs)+￿2￿2x2: Substituting the latter into
(A.14) and requiring that the resulting expression coincides (A.15) for all realizations of the signals,
we conclude that the coe¢ cients (￿0;￿1;:::;￿n) must solve the following system:
(￿0 ￿ ￿0)(1 ￿ ￿) =
(






￿s (1 ￿ ￿￿s) =
(





￿s; 8s 2 f1;:::;ng
The unique solution to this system gives






where denom ￿ ￿0
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34which implies that ￿s=￿s0 increases with ￿ if and only if ￿s > ￿s0; that is, a higher ￿ tilts the
equilibrium use of information towards the signal with the most correlated noise.
Consider now the signal-to-noise ratio in aggregate activity. From (A.16), the component of
aggregate activity that is explained by fundamentals is ^ K = E[Kj￿ ￿] = ￿0 +
P
s ￿s￿ ￿; the residual,
K ￿ ^ K =
P
s ￿s￿ ￿s; gives the non-fundamental component. It follows that the equilibrium signal-
to-noise ratio is given by
R ￿
V ar( ^ K)


































































Finally, since the signal-to-noise ratio along the e¢ cient allocation is given by the same formula
replacing ￿ with ￿￿, it is immediate that the equilibrium ratio is ine¢ ciently high if and only if
￿ > ￿￿: ￿










denote an agent￿ s payo⁄, net of taxes. The restrictions we have imposed on T guarantee that ~ V 2 V:
The characterization of the equilibrium then follows directly from the proofs of Propositions 1 and




￿~ Vkk ￿ ~ VkK
=
Vk (0;0;0;0) ￿ Tk (0;0;0)
￿Vkk ￿ VkK + Tkk + TkK
(A.17)
=
(1 ￿ ￿)￿0 + 1
VkkTk (0;0;0)















~ Vk￿ + ~ Vk￿ ￿
￿~ Vkk ￿ ~ VkK
￿ ~ ￿1 =
Vk￿ + Vk￿ ￿ ￿ Tk￿ ￿
￿Vkk ￿ VkK + Tkk + TkK
￿ ~ ￿1 (A.19)
=
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿1 + ￿2) + 1
VkkTk￿ ￿
















Normalizing Vkk = ￿1 then gives the formulas in the proposition. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5. By the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 3, the equi-


















This depends on the policy only through ~ ￿. It is thus independent of Tk￿ ￿ and increasing in TkK:￿
Proof of Proposition 6. We prove the result in reverse ordering.
Part (ii). Consider the case that ￿ is not common knowledge. Provided that the information
structure is regular in the sense of footnote 8, the policy implements the e¢ cient allocation if and
only if it induces ~ ￿0 = ￿￿
0; ~ ￿1 = ￿￿
1; ~ ￿2 = ￿￿
2; and ~ ￿ = ￿￿: It thus su¢ ces to prove that there exists
a policy T￿ 2 T that does so, and that this policy is unique. This is easily shown from conditions
(A.17)-(A.19) and (A.20). First, note that ~ ￿1 = ￿￿
1 if and only if
Tkk = Vkk(1 ￿ ￿1=￿￿
1) = ￿V￿￿:
Along with the assumption that Vkk +V￿￿ < 0; this also guarantees that Vkk ￿Tkk < 0: Next, note
that, since Tkk = ￿V￿￿, ~ ￿ = ￿￿ if and only
TkK = ￿Vkk (￿ ￿ ￿￿) ￿ Tkk￿￿ = ￿Vkk￿ + (Vkk + V￿￿)￿￿ = V￿￿ ￿ VkK ￿ VKK:
It is then immediate that TkK 6= 0 for all but a (Lebesgue) measure zero set of payo⁄ functions V
for which V￿￿ ￿VkK ￿VKK = 0: With (Tkk;TkK) thus determined, it is then immediate that there
exist a unique Tk￿ ￿ such that ~ ￿2 = ￿￿
2 and a unique Tk (0;0;0) such that ~ ￿0 = ￿￿
0; these are given by
Tk￿ ￿ = Vkk (1 ￿ ￿)[(￿￿
1 + ￿￿
2) ￿ (￿1 + ￿2)] ￿ (Tkk + TkK)(￿￿
1 + ￿￿
2) (A.21)
= ￿VK￿ ￿ VK￿ ￿;
36and
Tk (0;0;0) = Vkk (1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿
0 ￿ ￿0) ￿ (Tkk + TkK)￿￿
0 = ￿VK (0;0;0):








and that Tkk + T￿￿ = 0. Along with the other properties identi￿ed above, it is then easy to verify
that this is equivalent to imposing the following: T(0;0;0;0) = T￿ ￿(0;0;0) = T￿ ￿￿ ￿ = 0; TK(0;0;0) =
￿Tk(0;0;0) = VK (0;0;0); TKK = ￿2TkK ￿Tkk = ￿V￿￿+2VkK +2VKK; TK￿ ￿ = ￿Tk￿ ￿ = VK￿+VK￿ ￿;
and ￿nally T￿￿ = ￿Tkk: This also implies that the policy T is unique.
Part (i). Consider the case that ￿ is common knowledge. Now ~ ￿ and ￿￿ are irrelevant and the
policy implements the e¢ cient allocation if and only if it induces ~ ￿0 = ￿￿
0; ~ ￿1 = ￿￿
1; and ~ ￿2 = ￿￿
2;
whether ~ ￿ is equal to ￿￿ is no longer relevant. Once again, there is a unique Tkk that induces
~ ￿1 = ￿￿
1: However, because there is no need to induce ~ ￿ = ￿￿; TkK is free. As a result, ~ ￿2 = ￿￿
2 can
now be induced by appropriately setting either Tk￿ ￿ or TkK. It is then without any loss of optimality
to set TkK = 0 (or to any other arbitrary value) and then set Tk￿ ￿ as in (A.21). The rest of the
parameters of the policy are then determined as in the proof of part (ii) above. ￿
Proof of Proposition 7. In the case of additive measurement error,










v + T￿ ￿￿ ￿￿2
&:
The result then follows from noting that SOT is independent of ki and therefore does not a⁄ect
individual incentives. In the case of multiplicative measurement error,















In this case, the measurement error does a⁄ect incentives, but this does not complicate the results.
Indeed, all the steps in Propositions 4, 5 and 6 hold with ~ ￿ and ~ ￿ rede￿ned as follows:
~ ￿0 =
Vk (0;0;0;0) ￿ Tk (0;0;0)

















Vk￿ + Vk￿ ￿ ￿ Tk￿ ￿


















37The only di⁄erence is that the optimal tax now depends on ￿2
￿ and ￿2
v. ￿
Proof of Proposition 8. First, consider t = 1. Because information is exogenous in this
period, that the equilibrium strategy at t = 1 is unique and solves (11) follows directly from the
same argument as in Steps 1 and 2 of the proof of Proposition 2, with ￿(￿) = ￿0 + (￿1 + ￿2)￿ and
with the coe¢ cients (￿0;￿1;￿2) determined as in (A.11). Next consider t = 2: The information
structure is now endogenous but uniquely determined by the unique equilibrium strategy for t = 1:
That the equilibrium strategy at t = 2 is unique and solves (11) then follows again from Proposition
2. Repeating the same argument for all t > 2 establishes the result.
Proof of Proposition 9. First, consider t = 1: In this period, information is exogenous, with










































a;1: We then have
that the unique solution to (11) is given by
k1 (!i;1) = ￿(￿1Xi;1 + (1 ￿ ￿1)Y1); (A.23)




1]: To see this, start by guessing that the equilibrium
strategy satis￿es (A.23) for some coe¢ cient ￿1. Next, use this guess to compute aggregate activity
as K1 = ￿(￿1￿ + (1 ￿ ￿1)Y1). Finally, use the latter along with (11) and (A.22) to derive the
equilibrium ￿1.
Next, consider t = 2: In the second period, !i;2 = !i;1 [ (xi;2;y2;~ ￿2; ~ K1; ~ ￿1): The endogenous
signal is given by
~ K1 = ￿(￿1￿ + (1 ￿ ￿1)Y1) + ￿2
The information about ￿ contained in ~ K1 is thus the same as that contained in
~ y2 ￿
~ K1 ￿ ￿((1 ￿ ￿1)Y1)
￿0￿1
= ￿ + ~ ￿2;
where ~ ￿2 = ￿2=[￿0￿1] is Gaussian noise with variance ￿2
~ ￿;2 = ￿2
￿;2=(￿0)
2 ￿2
1: The signal ~ ￿1, on the




is common knowledge. It follows that the period-2 public information about ￿ can be summarized







































￿;2: Similarly, the private information can be sum-
















x;2. The unique solution to (11) is then k2 (!i;2) = ￿(￿2Xi;2 + (1 ￿ ￿2)Y2);





A similar argument applied also to t ￿ 3, establishing that the unique equilibrium strategy is
ki;t (!i;t) = ￿(￿tXi;t + (1 ￿ ￿t)Yt); with
￿t ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)￿x




and with the statistics Xi;t an Yt de￿ned recursively as in the proposition. ￿
Proof of Proposition 10. We prove the result in three steps. Step 1 establishes that
the optimal strategy is linear in the su¢ cient statistics for the case where there are no payo⁄
interactions; this step echoes a similar result by Vives (1993). Step 2 extends this property to the
case with payo⁄ interactions. Step 3 completes the result by characterizing the optimal weight on
the two statistics.
Step 1. We momentarily rule out payo⁄ interactions by assuming
V (k;K;￿;￿) = v (k;￿) ￿ ￿(k ￿ ￿)
2 :
Let ht = fy1;~ ￿1; ~ K1;:::;yt￿1;~ ￿t￿1; ~ Kt￿1;yt;~ ￿tg denote the public history in period t and suppose
agents follow a strategy k = fktgN
t=1 such that




where Pt (ht) is a deterministic function of ht and Qt;￿ are deterministic coe¢ cients. It follows that
ki;t = Pt + ￿t￿ +
Pt
￿=1 Qt;￿￿i;￿; and hence ~ Kt = Pt + ￿t￿ + ￿t+1, where Pt is a shortcut for Pt (ht)
and ￿t ￿
Pt
￿=1 Qt;￿: Welfare (ex-ante utility) is then Eu =
PN
t=1 wt, where
wt ￿ E[v (ki;t;At+1)] = E[v (ki;t;￿)] ￿ ￿2
a;t+1
39and where






















Now consider a strategy ^ k = f^ ktgN
t=1 that is a variation of the initial strategy k = fktgN
t=1
constructed as follows. First, pick an arbitrary t and let ^ ki;s(!i;s) = ki;s(!i;s) for all s < t: Next,
in period t; pick an arbitrary function ^ Pt and any coe¢ cients ^ Qt;￿ such that
Pt
￿=1 ^ Qt;￿ = ￿t; and
let ^ kt(!i;t) = ^ Pt (ht) +
Pt
￿=1 ^ Qt;￿xi;￿: Finally, for all s > t; let ^ ks(!i;s) = ^ Ps (hs) +
Ps
￿=1 Qs;￿xi;￿;
where the functions ^ Ps are such that ^ Ps(:::; ~ Kt;:::) = Ps(:::; ~ Kt ￿ ^ Pt(ht) + Pt(ht);:::):
By construction, at any period s 6= t; the strategy ^ k induces the same outcomes, and by
implication the same per-period welfare level wt, as the initial strategy k: It follows that a necessary






^ Pt; ^ Qt;￿
E
￿￿













￿=1 ^ Qt;￿ = ￿t
This in turn is the case if and only if, for all t and all ht






Next note that, because Pt is public information, the observation in period t + 1 of ~ Kt =
Kt + ￿t = Pt + ￿t￿ + ￿t is informationally equivalent to the observation of a signal
~ yt+1 ￿
~ Kt ￿ Pt
￿t
= ￿ + ~ ￿t+1
where ￿t+1 = ￿t+1=￿t is Gaussian noise with precision ￿￿2
~ ￿;t+1 = ￿2
t￿￿2
￿;t+1: It follows that, given any
linear strategy, the common posterior about ￿ in period t is Gaussian with mean E[￿jht] = Yt and
precision ￿
y
t; where Yt and ￿
y





































with initial conditions Y1 = ￿0 and ￿
y
1 = ￿￿2


































with initial conditions Xi;1 = xi;1 and ￿x
1 = ￿￿2








together with (A.24) gives
Ps
￿=1 Qt;￿xi￿ = ￿tXi;t: We conclude that a linear strategy k maximizes
ex-ante utility only if, for all t and all !i;t; ki;t (!i;t) = (1 ￿ ￿t)Yt + ￿tXi;t; for some ￿t.
Step 2. For more general payo⁄s V , let ￿￿ (￿) ￿ argmax￿ V (￿;￿;0;￿): A similar argument as
in Step 1 ensures that the e¢ cient linear strategy must satisfy
kt (!it) = ￿￿ (￿tXit + (1 ￿ ￿t)Yt)
for some ￿t: What then remains is to characterize the optimal f￿tg
N
t=1, which is what we do next.

























t=1 ￿t￿1W (￿￿ (￿);0;￿) is the ￿rst-best level of welfare. Noting that the ￿￿ s
impact only the evolution of public information, and using Wvol < 0; Wdis < 0; and Wvol=Wdis =























where ￿t ￿ ￿￿2
";t +￿￿2




denote the associated value function in period t: (The existence of these values functions, and hence






























The FOC for ￿t gives
￿t (￿x
t )
















41The envelope condition for ￿
y
































t + (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿x
















The SOC guarantees that the denominator is positive, and hence that ￿t > 0. (However, note that
1 ￿ ￿t < 1 is possible, which means that the sensitivity to public information can change sign.)
Finally, note that the preceding analysis presumes that the value functions L and the optimal
strategy exist; this can be shown recursively. ￿
Proof of Proposition 11. Let f￿￿￿
t gN
t=1 be the coe¢ cients that characterize the e¢ cient linear





t=1 be the corresponding precisions of private and
public information generated by the e¢ cient linear strategy. The result then follows from letting
￿￿￿











In fact, it is then and only then that the unique solution to (17) coincides with the strategy obtained
in Proposition 10. ￿
Proof of Proposition 12. The existence of a policy that implements the e¢ cient allocation
follows from the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 7 for the case of additive measurement
error. That the optimal contingency TkK is necessarily higher than in the absence of informational
externalities then follows directly from two facts: that ￿￿￿
t < ￿￿; that the measurement error per
se does not a⁄ect the optimal TkK. ￿
Proof of Proposition 13. Consider the environments with both exogenous and endogenous
Gaussian signals studied in Section 6. The result follows directly from the proof of Proposition
11, where it is shown that, for all periods t, the present-value welfare losses Lt obtained along
the e¢ cient linear strategy are decreasing functions of ￿x
t and ￿
y
t; the precisions of private and
public information available in the beginning of period t. Putting aside informational externalities,
the result can also be established for non-Gaussian signals using a Blackwell-like argument for the
planner￿ s problem that characterizes the e¢ cient strategy. ￿
42Appendix B: An interpretation of the coe¢ cient ￿￿
Consider any arbitrary strategy k : ￿ ! R. Given this strategy, de￿ne the function ^ k : ￿￿H ! R
by the following rule:
^ k(￿i;h) ￿ E[k(!i)j￿i;h]:
Accordingly, let ^ K(h) ￿
R ^ k(￿;h)dh(￿) and ^ ￿2
k(h) ￿
R
[^ k(￿;h) ￿ ^ K(h)]2dh(￿). The action of any
agent i can then be decomposed in three components:
ki = ^ ki + ￿ + vi
The term ^ ki ￿ ^ k(￿i;h) captures the variation in individual activity that is ￿explained￿by variation
in the underlying fundamentals. The term ￿ ￿ (K ￿ ^ K) captures the non-fundamental variation in
individual activity that is common across agents; that is, ￿ captures the impact of common noise in
information. Finally, the term vi ￿ (k ￿ K) ￿ (^ k ￿ ^ K) captures the non-fundamental variation in
individual activity that is idiosyncratic to the agent; that is, vi captures the impact of idiosyncratic
noise. (Note that, by construction, ^ ki; ￿ and vi are orthogonal one to the other.) The following
result shows that a similar decomposition applies to ex-ante welfare; it then uses this decomposition
to relate the coe¢ cient ￿￿ to social aversion over non-fundamental volatility.
Proposition 14. (i) Given any strategy k : ￿ ! R; ex-ante utility (welfare) is given by
Eu = E[V (^ k; ^ K; ^ ￿k;￿)] +
1
2




where E[V (^ k; ^ K; ^ ￿k;￿)] measures the welfare contribution of the fundamental component of activity;
vol ￿ Var(￿) = Var(K)￿Var( ^ K) and dis ￿ Var(vi) = Var(k ￿ K)￿Var(^ k￿ ^ K) measure the non-
fundamental volatility and the non-fundamental dispersion of activity; and Wvol ￿ Vkk + 2V2kK +
VKK < 0 and Wdis ￿ Vkk + V￿￿ < 0 parameterize the social aversion to these two types of noise.
(ii) The e¢ cient degree of complementarity is negatively related to social aversion to non-
fundamental volatility relative to social aversion to non-fundamental dispersion:




Proof. Part (i) follows from taking a second-order Taylor expansion of V (ki;K;￿k;￿) around
the point (^ ki; ^ K; ^ ￿k;￿), aggregating across all states to obtain ex-ante utility, and using the fact
that, by construction, the random variables ^ ki; ￿ and vi are orthogonal to one another, with E[￿] =
E[vi] = 0; a detailed derivation is available upon request. Part (ii) then follows from combining
the de￿nition of the coe¢ cients Wvol and Wdis with the characterization of the coe¢ cient ￿￿ in the
proof of Proposition 2. ￿
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